Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 3, Number 2 (April 1965)

Article 25

The London Life Insurance Company v. Chase
[1963] S.C.R. 267
R. L. W.

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Commentary

Citation Information
W., R. L.. "The London Life Insurance Company v. Chase [1963] S.C.R. 267." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 3.2 (1965) : 250-251.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol3/iss2/25

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

250

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 3

The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered by Judson J. In
dismissing the appeal the reasons of the Court of Appeal were
adopted based as they were on the earlier decision of the Supreme
Court in Andrews and George. The Featherstone case was disapproved. Particular attention it would seem was paid to the holding
by Sheppard J.A. that "liability assumed under contract" and "liability
imposed by law" where for one and the same loss and hence caught
by the exclusion clause. For this reason, though no opinion was expressed, it may be possible in a later case to avoid the present result
when the "same loss" test cannot be applied. R.L.W.

The London Life Insurance Company v. Chase [1963] S.C.R. 267.
The Supreme Court in a rather tragic case was given the opportunity to consider the burden of proof resting on those alleging the
commission of a criminal or quasi-criminal offence in civil proceedings.
The late Robert Leroy Chase, the respondent's husband, was an
apparently normal young man of twenty-three, living in his own home
with his wife and two children and gainfully employed. On the
evening of May 1st, 1959 on returning from a "stag" party he kissed
his wife dozing in the living room and then went in succession from
the bathroom to a storage room in the rear of the house. His wife
heard a noise and on entering the storage room found the deceased
lying prone, a rifle beside him, and with a fatal bullet wound in his
right temple. The appellant Insurance Company disclaimed liability
on a life insurance policy on the deceased's life by reason of an
exclusion clause which read as follows:
In case the life insured shall die by his own hand whether sane or Insane,
within two years from the date on which this policy is issued, the liability
of the company hereunder shall be limited to an amount equal to the
premiums paid on the policy without interest.
The appellant produced the evidence of a qualified expert that
having regard to the nature of the wound, the position of the body
and the character of the rifle, suicide was the only logical explanation
of the death. The trial judge held the Insurance Company had not
satisfied the onus resting on it to prove the commission of suicide
and ordered payment of the proceeds of the policy to the respondent
widow. This judgment was affirmed by a majority of the Manitoba
Court of Appeal.
The appellant brought its appeal to the Supreme Court alleging
that the trial judge and the majority of the Court of Appeal had
misdirected themselves as to the proper standard of proof applicable
to the circumstances. They relied on excerpts from the lower court
judgments as indicating the judges had applied the criminal or even
higher standard of proof.
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Bastin J. had said at trial:
I have come to the conclusion that however unlikely accident may be as
an explanation of the death it is not beyond all possibility and it is not
more unlikely than that this normal, cheerful, happy young man deliberately took his life.

In the Court of Appeal in delivering the decision of the majority
Schultz J. had used equally strong language. Ritchie J. speaking for
the Supreme Court in dismissing the appeal refused to view segments
of the lower judgments in isolation:
After considering the decisions of Bastin J. and Schultz J. in their entirety,
Ithe
cannot
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cluded the preponderance of evidence weighed in the plaintiff's favour.

The learned judge considered this approach to be in complete
accord with the rule accepted in earlier decisions of the Supreme
Court. 1 This was undoubtedly sufficient to dispose of the case but
Ritchie 3. felt compelled to deal with this strong dissent of Tritschler
J.A. in the Court of Appeal that had been relied on largely by the
appellant. The majority in the Court of Appeal had placed considerable weight on the fact that no evidence of motive had been produced
by the appellant. Ttschler J.A. felt that the failure of the appellant
to produce evidence of motive should never be decisive against him,
that the proof of suicide was to be sought in the circumstances of the
death and in his opinion these circumstances forced him to the conclusion th
h death was self-inflictete wtient.
hedat
Ritchie .
admitted that evidence of motive was of little probative value in
rebutting the presumption against suicide but in his opinion it did not
necessarily follow that the complete absence of evidence of motive
when taken in conjunction with the unnatural quality of the act of
self-destruction can never be a decisive factor in support of the theory
that death was accidental.
R.L.W.
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